Branden W. Joseph: Since *Grey Room* is primarily dedicated to questions of aesthetic practice, I’d like to begin by asking how you would understand forms of cultural discourse—for example, art—having access to the political or, rather, to the strictly political in the way you have come to define it through your work on Carl Schmitt? As Derrida notes in *Politics of Friendship*—although we don’t need to go to Derrida for this—“the political” exists for Schmitt on two levels: “the political” as a particular aspect (which Schmitt is always opposing to “the economic,” for example, or “the moral”), and “the political” as a determination that occurs throughout all other strata of the world and, thus, potentially includes economics, morality, and, I would assume, culture and aesthetics as well. In your conceptualization of “the political,” how does it act on these two levels? Or is there some other articulation of a cultural discourse and a strictly political discourse?

Chantal Mouffe: The distinction I make is inspired by Schmitt. It’s certainly not made in the same way by Schmitt, but I think my idea is faithful to what he said. What I call “the political” is the dimension of antagonism—the friend/enemy distinction. And, as Schmitt says, this can emerge out of any kind of relation. It’s not something that can be localized precisely; it’s an ever-present possibility. What I call “politics,” on the other hand, is the ensemble of discourses and practices, institutional or even artistic practices, that contribute to and reproduce a certain order. These are always in conditions that are potentially conflictual because they are always informed by, or traversed by, the dimension of “the political.” In that context, they can be linked to Gramsci’s ideas of common sense and of hegemony. Politics is always about the establishment, the reproduction, or the deconstruction of a hegemony, one that is always in relation to a potentially counter-hegemonic order. Since the dimension of “the political” is always present, you can never have a complete, absolute, inclusive hegemony. In that context, artistic and cultural practices are absolutely central as one of the levels where identifications and forms
of identity are constituted. One cannot make a distinction between political art and non-political art, because every form of artistic practice either contributes to the reproduction of the given common sense—and in that sense is political—or contributes to the deconstruction or critique of it. Every form of art has a political dimension.

Rosalyn Deutsche: That’s why I, like many artists and critics, avoid the term “political art”: Precisely because it asserts that other art—indeed art per se or so-called real art—is not political, “political art” is a powerful political weapon, one that is routinely deployed to ghettoize art that avows the political. Similarly, the term “feminist art” insinuates that art itself is free of sexual politics.

BWJ: Yet there’s a quote by Schmitt that you, Chantal, use quite a bit, about liberalism oscillating between the moral and the economic, which seems to imply that there is a level that somehow does not accede to the properly political.

CM: That’s where I want to distinguish between “the political” and politics. Some artistic practices can become the locus of “the political” in the Schmittian sense, as the dimension of antagonism, just like any other kind of practice, when they become constructed in terms of friend and enemy. Then they become political in Schmittian terms, like moral relations that can become political, or like economic relations that can become political. As I said, “the political” is not something that is located anywhere specific; it emerges out of any relation.

BWJ: And it’s precisely at that point, when artistic practices accede to the level of the Schmittian political, that all of those institutional forces come into play—as they did with Haacke’s submission to the Whitney Biennial this year—that say, “this is not art, it’s politics and therefore shouldn’t be allowed.” The same, of course, happened before with Haacke’s real estate pieces in the 1970s.

RD: Which is a supremely political act, just as the invocation of morality is most political when it’s used to evade politics. Before the interview, Branden suggested that we discuss Haacke’s new work for the Reichstag, which is a good idea since it’s hard to think of a topic that more neatly combines art, architecture, and political philosophy, thereby bringing the four of us together.

BWJ: I found it interesting that the definition of the people within a Western democratic state, in this case Germany, has become the point of Haacke’s proposal of placing in dialogue with the Reichstag’s existing inscription, Dem Deutschen Volke, another one declaring, Der Bevölkerung. At issue seems to be a redefinition of the homogeneity that you have discussed as necessary for a democratic state, a redefinition of the political us/them or friend/enemy distinction.
Can this be considered an example of a new type of political identification or a re-identifying of the political imaginary that you’ve been proposing?

CM: I find this an extremely interesting issue. It is, as Rosalyn says, really a place where political philosophy, art, and architecture come together. If one considers this piece an intervention, something that would deconstruct or question the way in which “the German people” could be understood, it is fascinating. And of course that would mean questioning the idea that the Volk is understood on an ethnic basis.

RD: What are your thoughts about Haacke’s choice of “the population” to replace or contest “the people” of the Reichstag’s existing inscription? Does the term “population” respond to what you consider the problem of how to imagine a commonality that is compatible with pluralism, how to form a democratic alternative to authoritarian uses of the people? It seems to me that in the German context, during a period of neo-Nazi and anti-immigrant sentiment, “population” calls for the inclusion of non-citizen permanent residents in the definition of the people. But I also think that Haacke’s question resonates in a far broader context: all Western cities that are marked by unprecedented numbers of non-Western foreigners—the result of global migration streams—and by violence against strangers.

CM: If Haacke were proposing to replace the inscription Dem Deutschen Volke by Der Bevölkerung, I wouldn’t find this adequate. I don’t think that der Bevölkerung, “the population,” is a political concept. Indeed, some of the discussions in Germany point, perhaps unknowingly, to that fact in arguing that the piece is somehow anticonstitutional. “The population” is not a concept that can be the locus of popular sovereignty. It’s a descriptive, sociological concept. And the Reichstag must, of course, be the locus of the people in a political sense. That doesn’t mean that “the people” must be understood only in terms of race, or even, necessarily, in terms of the people who are at the moment German citizens.

If Haacke’s piece is seen as a way of questioning the manner in which “the German people” is currently defined, then it is a very interesting intervention. In terms of political philosophy, it points to the need to redefine “the people,” to extend it by introducing people who have until now not been considered citizens. But that should not happen by abandoning the idea of “the people” because it’s necessarily related to either a Nazi past or to a certain type of exclusion. The existence of a certain type of exclusion is something that politics cannot do without. That is one of the questions I’ve been trying to address in my thinking about
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Schmitt and the idea of “the demos.” You cannot have a demos if it is not in some sense exclusive. The very idea of “the demos” simultaneously implies both a logic of inclusion within and exclusion without. It can never be the case that everyone who happens to be in a certain territory—be it France or Germany—should be entitled to vote. There needs to be a definition of who constitutes the body of citizens, who constitutes “the people.” This is something that needs to be discussed in Germany—less now, perhaps, with the broader immigration laws, although the conception of “the people” is still too restricted. However, it can never be a question of replacing the political conception of “the people” with the sociological concept of “the population.”

Thomas Keenan: Somehow Haacke’s Reichstag piece implicitly follows a narrative from Foucault, doesn’t it? There’s a shift from a notion of politics that refers ultimately to “the people” and the logic of popular sovereignty—politics understood as the problem of sovereignty—to what Foucault called “bio-politics” within a disciplinary regime, in which the privileged categories are, precisely, “population” and “territory.”

CM: Yes. That is right. But the same objection could be made to what Foucault calls “bio-politics,” which designates the form of governmentality developed by liberalism. Liberalism does away with political concepts and attempts to replace them with non-political ones like “humanity” or “population.” For that reason, the logic of liberalism is always in tension with the democratic one, which requires the possibility of drawing a frontier between who belongs and who does not belong. This is why I have recently argued that we should acknowledge the paradoxical nature of liberal democracy.

RD: Haacke makes at least two gestures in his installation. The larger gesture is raising the democratic question, that is, making “the people” a question. The work sets in motion an ongoing debate in the very seat of state power, which in a democracy resides elsewhere: in the people. And the symbol of that power is embodied in the Reichstag, a neoclassical building, with all the obvious connotations of solid, timeless truths that supposedly derive from a source outside the social world. To me, the work is like a performance of Claude Lefort’s idea that democracy emerges and stays alive only when the meaning of society is uncertain and therefore open to question. The space between the two Reichstag inscriptions, the space of the question, is the heart of the work.

A second gesture is opening a question specific to the German site. The status of immigrants is going to be raised in viewers’ minds immediately. So “population”
isn’t really a neutral term; it’s already politicized by the present context. Haacke is very careful to pay attention to the moment. Your objection to “population” reminds me a bit of your objection to “humanity” as a political category. You say that this category—because it is seemingly all-inclusive—denies that “the people” is constituted through exclusion and a moment of closure. Therefore it evades the political. How do you feel about theories which propose that in current circumstances we should construct a political subject with a different identity than that of the citizen? For example, Giorgio Agamben, drawing on Hannah Arendt, wants to make the refugee, who interrupts the nation-state, the key political figure for our time.  

CM: Arendt, when she speaks of the right to have rights, insists that the right to have rights is citizenship. If you are not a citizen, you don’t have the right to have rights. Thus, in fact, she insists very much on the importance of being a citizen. She does not propose the refugee as the new political subject, but sees the refugee as a symptom of a problem. The solution is not to replace the guarantee of the citizen by the guarantee of the refugee. Rather, we should make those refugees citizens of a country because it is only on that basis that they will have rights. Arendt is critical of the idea of purely human rights. She thinks that there is something very problematic about human rights because, if they are not at the same time citizenship rights, they are abstract and do not correspond to anything.

RD: Arendt also says that the right to have rights is the right of every individual to belong to humanity. If the right to have rights is understood as the right to declare rights, which is to say the right to politics, how can we say that only the citizen can declare this right?

TK: Obviously, the question of rights and their “basis,” human or otherwise, is unusually complicated. The question goes to the heart of what politics might mean for us. Etienne Balibar addresses this elegantly in his reading of the 1789 French Declaration, which claimed rights for “man and citizen.” Is it because you’re a citizen that you have access to human rights? Or is it because you’re a
human that you have access to citizen’s rights? There’s a tension, fundamental or at least irreducible, there. Arendt tries to solve it in the direction of privileging and demanding citizenship for all humans. Humans don’t become political until they are accepted, recognized, and legitimated as citizens. That’s the politicizing move in Arendt: to insist that humans have to be granted access to citizenship or else they don’t have rights. What Rosalyn is suggesting, I think, is that it would be plausible to say that humans have a kind of a meta-right, a right to politics. It’s not automatically granted; it has to be struggled for and so on—like all rights, by the way—but when you, as it were, make it into politics, then you transcend your merely human existence. That’s what you strive for. The depoliticizing move is to eject people from citizenship back into humanity, which is what Arendt wants to fight against. The hyphen in what Balibar calls the “man-citizen”—he insists on the “identification” or the “equation” of the apparently different concepts, originally joined by the “and” of the Declaration, and rewrites it with a hyphen and an equal sign—is difficult to read, and politically important, precisely because it opens the possibility of this slippage.

CM: I still think “humanity” is not a political concept, although it can clearly be used in a political way. The rhetoric of rights and the rhetoric of humanity are very powerful instruments in interrupting the danger that is inscribed in the democratic logic: the movement toward exclusion, which is what I tried to explain in my article on Schmitt. Too many liberal democrats believe that liberty and equality necessarily go together. There is actually a very profound tension between the two ideas, and in my last book this democratic paradox is precisely what I tried to explain. In a certain sense, I think Schmitt is right when he says that liberalism negates democracy and democracy negates liberalism because, in fact, they are two different logics which are ultimately incompatible. Where I think Schmitt is wrong is when he says that, as a consequence, liberal democracy is an unviable regime and must necessarily self-destruct. What I’ve been trying to show is that, in fact, what he sees as the main fundamental weakness of liberal
democracy is its great strength. In essence, the articulation of those two independent logics creates the space in which pluralist democracy is possible. Within the pure logic of democracy is inscribed the possibility of totalitarianism, and the logic of liberalism, without its articulation with democracy, would be a pure logic of dissemination, a logic of difference without any possibility for the struggle for equality or self-government. Within the articulation of these two logics, however, liberalism and the reference to humanity constantly subvert the totalitarian tendency to exclusion inscribed within the democratic project.

The democratic logic of creating a demos and establishing a frontier is also what allows for the creation of citizenship and the exercise of rights. The exercise of rights is the important part of the equation. For, the liberal logic is a logic of the assertion of rights, but it’s only within its articulation with democracy—through participation in a demos, through being a democratic citizen—that you can exercise rights. It’s one thing to have rights, it’s another to be able to exercise those rights. Without the link between liberalism’s rights and democracy, we would just have rights, human rights, without the possibility of exercising them. That, I think, is what Arendt was saying. If you don’t have the possibility of being a citizen of a nation, you can’t exercise your rights. But where I see the importance of the idea of “humanity” is in its capacity to interrupt the idea of “the demos” and bring to the fore the fact that a demos is always predicated on the exclusion of certain people.

RD: So “population” can be used in the same ways as “humanity.”
CM: Yes.
RD: But insofar as “population” breaks the identity between birth and nationality, it is politicizing, not neutralizing. Also, it’s so deadpan, whereas “humanity” is a very inspiring concept. That’s one reason people objected to Haacke’s piece. How can you be inspired by the term “the population”? Can you imagine saying “we, the population”? But I read somewhere that Haacke considered the uninspiring quality of the term to be a virtue. Given German history—among many other histories—one can understand why.
CM: It’s problematic to replace the idea of “the people” by the idea of “the population,” for the latter is not something that can provide an identification. A democratic citizen is somebody who identifies with being part of “the people,” and merely being part of the population is not, in this sense, a political identification. Its importance is in showing the limitations that go into the definition of “the people,” or, in this case, “the German people.” Who constitutes the German

people? In Germany, there are obviously people who are not part of the German nation, so how can we redefine the German people so that the gap between the people and the population will be minimized? But, even though we should try to make the German people as inclusive as possible, there will never be a complete identification between the population and the people.

**BWJ:** In that sense, what Haacke’s piece establishes is a permanent mechanism of subverting or critiquing the historical meaning of the *Volk* at a particular moment in time, a mechanism by which one can disarticulate and rearticulate the idea of “the people.”

**CM:** Yes, and this is happening constantly. From that point of view I find the work really interesting. It’s a question of constantly making people aware of the gap between the people and the population. But you cannot simply replace “the people.” In politics, in democratic politics, you need a form of identification. The *Bevölkerung* is not a political concept.

**BWJ:** If “population” is too sociological a concept to become a political concept, what is the mechanism by which one then rearticulates “the political”? Is there any way the sociological concept of the population can become a political concept, without simply accessioning more people to the *Volk* with all of the historical connotations that it has in German? In other words, can one rearticulate “the population” as a political identification within a liberal European democratic society?

**CM:** And abandon the term *Volk*? I think that concepts like “the people” play such an important role in the political imaginary that they shouldn’t be abandoned. They should really be redefined. There is, of course, the whole question in Germany of Nazism and people arguing that the German language has been too tainted by it . . . but I think that’s very dangerous. If the Left does not occupy that terrain, if it does not appropriate and mobilize those symbols, it leaves that terrain to the Right. I would not want to replace the idea of “the Volk,” but contest it and redefine it in the direction of inclusion. That’s, after all, what’s been happening recently with the new German immigration laws. I don’t think that you can say that the idea of “the Volk” has been so absolutely or definitely tainted by Nazism that it can’t be used.

**TK:** You said earlier that one of the signs that *Bevölkerung* isn’t a political category is that one can be interpolated or identify with *Volk* but not with the *Bevölkerung.* Why not? Why couldn’t you imagine the *Bevölkerung* as a political category? Let’s move slightly to the south, to the former Yugoslavia, and
think about the Yugoslav equivalent of Volk, which is narod, the nation or the people. Bosnia right now, after Dayton, is effectively divided into three sectors, organized in ethno-national terms: Croatian, Serbian, and so-called Muslim or Bosniac. For me, the political meaning of the war there was that the Sarajevo government, primarily Bosniac, fought against the concept, the political principle, of the narod, in favor of something only loosely translated as “multi-ethnicity”—in the name of the people, all the different people, who happened to live there. It was a war of the ideology of the narod, of “the people” or “the Volk,” against a politics of mixing or confusion, of multiculturalism in the rich sense, and so on. So there you had a rather Schmittian paradigm of a war, of a division between friend and enemy. But on one side it was on behalf of a notion of Volk, narod, and on the other side it was against that very concept, against that definition of politics itself.

CM: We need to specify at what level we are speaking of the people. When I think of “the people”—and this is what I think when I think of the Reichstag—the people is the community of citizens, the ones for whom the Reichstag is the place and symbol of self-government. The people are all those who have the right to be part of this democratic assembly of the citizens, the body of the constituents of the citizens who are going to make laws.

TK: What Haacke is pointing out is that there is a large number of people who ought to be included in that, who aren’t.

CM: Of course, Haacke’s artistic, political intervention is constantly showing that “the people” is something that is discursively constructed differently at different moments. It is not a question of challenging “the people” as an essentialist category that must be abandoned. With the new laws in Germany, “the people” is not the same thing as it was under Helmut Kohl. There are still, of course, too many exclusions, and we still want much more of the Bevölkerung to become part of the Volk, but it is important to maintain this difference between the empirical fact of who happens to be living within this country at a given moment and who is a citizen. Not to do so would put an end to democracy, because it would create a democracy without a demos. You can’t have a demos without drawing the line between those who are part of it and those who are not.

RD: I understand your point. But if the citizen, not man, is in reality the bearer of human rights, how do we think about the limits of the national political conscience, which, according to Julia Kristeva, makes us consider “it normal that there are . . . people who do not have the same rights as we do”? How can we
reconcile Kristeva’s caution with the necessity of the demos?

CM: But in order to take care of that situation, you don’t need to abandon the idea of the foreigner altogether. It’s a question of where you draw the line, but you need to draw the line. I don’t think it is a question of normalizing the situation of the foreigner, because it’s always a line that is constantly subverted, that is constantly being put into question. Still, in order to put it into question, you have to have it. Here, one needs to distinguish between human rights and citizenship rights. I can’t imagine how we can get rid of the idea of the foreigner, but being a foreigner in a country doesn’t mean that you lose all of your rights. There are many rights that you still have. But what I’m talking about specifically are the democratic rights of self-government, the right to vote and so on.

TK: But what is the political meaning of those human rights that supersede or somehow exceed democratic citizenship rights? Are the only interesting political rights those that derive from citizenship? Or is it possible to begin to define what the political character of those strictly human rights might be? We could begin that analysis by examining the increasing number of transnational institutions that claim to, and increasingly do, have the capacity—the economic capacity and the military-political force—to exercise, as you rightfully put it, or to assist in the exercise of those rights. Whether we’re talking about humanitarian NGOs [nongovernmental aid organizations], which wield increasingly large amounts of power and even have the possibility of organizing military force; or the media; or the European Court of Human Rights, which has the capacity to impose its decisions on nation states; or certain transnational corporations. We now have a whole set of non-state institutions, some of which have the ability to make increasingly powerful claims in the name of human rights. My question is, do we just write them off as non-political institutions because they’re not derived from states? Or are they analogous to states, or somehow state-like organisms? How do you evaluate them?

CM: That relates to our earlier discussion of citizenship. And here I would make a distinction between certain institutions of “cosmopolitan democracy,” which I would be in favor of, and the idea of “cosmopolitan citizenship,” which I am against. I don’t think the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship really makes sense. I think it is a liberal illusion that you can have citizenship without belonging to a demos. The cosmopolitan citizen, if it were ever developed, would simply be the citizen with rights that cannot be exercised anywhere. When they were violated, this citizen might have tribunals to which he could appeal, but he would
not have the possibility to exercise his right to self-government.

RD: But you would accept the idea of cosmopolitan democracy. How so? To be democratic, doesn’t a government have to derive its power from a people?

CM: The idea of cosmopolitan forms of democratic governance needs to be distinguished from cosmopolitan citizenship. It means that you still have a somewhat traditional form of citizenship, although there is no need to link that idea of citizenship to the idea of the nation-state. That connection is something I would want to criticize. Yet, to abandon the idea that citizenship needs necessarily to be linked to the nation-state doesn’t entail going to the other extreme and believing that citizenship can therefore become cosmopolitan. One can imagine a form of demos which is not the nation-state. After all, the Greek *polis* was not a nation-state. Today, with the formation of the European Union, for instance, there is clearly a possibility of developing a form of citizenship that would not correspond to the nation-state, but which would nevertheless correspond to a demos. For me, this is not a contradiction, and I think it’s something that’s needed. Humanity, however, is not a demos, and the de facto consequence of cosmopolitan citizenship would be humanity: just by the fact that you are a human being, you are a citizen.

Today, however, there does need to be a form of citizenship linked to transformations in the demos. Because of the processes of globalization, there is an important need for forms of democratic governance which are transnational or cosmopolitan. But this is not the same thing as a cosmopolitan citizenship. Maybe it will happen, but that will mean the end of democratic self-government. Something important would have been lost in that transition to cosmopolitan citizenship, and I don’t think it is a progress that we, on the Left, should be advocating or looking toward.

RD: Why couldn’t cosmopolitan citizenship be organized along the same lines as national citizenship? You’ve said that radical democratic citizenship is based on adherence to certain ethico-political values, such as the value of contesting relations of subordination. Why couldn’t international citizenship be based on membership in an international democracy rather than humanity? Isn’t that a political identity with which it is possible to identify? For you, identification with particular ethico-political principles is the criterion of democratic citizenship, is it not?

CM: Yes, except that the democratic citizenship is always allegiance to a demos that is informed by certain ethico-political values.
RD: But why couldn’t the demos be international?

CM: Let me give you an example concerning Habermas’s conception of “constitutioonal patriotism.” There is a significant difference between us. I want to retain the idea of particularity, in the sense of a relation to a specific demos: France or Germany, for example, or the European Union, etc. I believe that a political community is always a community which is ordered symbolically according to a certain set of values, which I call the ethico-political principles of a regime. And for me citizenship is allegiance to the ethico-political principles of a particular demos. Habermas, on the contrary, wants to get rid of all the particularities in his idea of a patriotism of the constitution. And the constitution, for him of course, is an expression of universal rights. I don’t believe that the principles that inform liberal democracy are the only legitimate ones. Liberal democracy is one form of democracy, but there are other forms. I would not argue in favor of the universalization of liberal democracy throughout the world. Habermas, however, would want us to believe that there is one set of ethico-political principles and all the world should be organized upon them, and this is also an idea that is implicit in cosmopolitan citizenship: that there is one set of universal values which should be accepted by all rational or reasonable citizens. However, I believe very much that the world—and here again I’m drawing on the ideas of Schmitt—is a “pluriverse” in the sense that there are differently determined political communities. We should accept the possibility of legitimate forms of government which are not identical to our own, i.e. liberal democracy.

Moreover, this allegiance to the principles of the particular demos is not purely intellectual. It’s not merely a question, as it tends to be in Habermas, of recognizing that there are certain principles which every rational being should accept. There is always an element of affect, a mobilization of affect or a mobilization of passions. It’s a real identification in the sense that one’s identity is truly at stake in the idea of being democratic citizens, and that is only possible through some element of particularity. That’s why I believe that it’s very dangerous for the Left to reject patriotism. I want to defend some kind of left-wing patriotism, some link with the tradition of what it is for a German to be German, or for a French person to be French. This does not necessarily even have to be phrased as being a member of a nation-state either. One proposal that I find extremely interesting is the one made recently by Massimo Cacciari, the philosopher and former mayor of Venice, who has recently been arguing for what he calls a new form of federalism. (Here in America, Federalism means precisely the opposite of what Cacciari means.
Indeed, according to his understanding, the real federalists in America were the anti-Federalists.) Cacciari is advocating a federalism that would operate not from the top down, but from the bottom up. He is attempting to think of the way in which Europe could reorganize itself on the basis of localities or regions. To realize what he’s trying to do, you must realize that he is fighting with the Lega Nord. Like me, he believes that we cannot leave such topics to the Right. We need to intervene on questions of regional identity.

Given the current crisis of the nation-state, we can’t just go on thinking about citizenship in the same way. We need to rethink it, not only through some types of democratic governmental agencies at transnational or multinational levels, but also by trying to recover the meaning of democracy in terms of regional localities, even ones not necessarily formed—and this is what I find interesting in his proposal—on the basis of actually established national frontiers. For instance, as Cacciari says, there are a lot of common cultural and economic spaces between the south of France and Italy. The same is true between France and Spain in a different sense, as well as between parts of Austria and Italy. So one can think of what such a recomposition of the political map would look like. We can even, Cacciari says, think in certain circumstances of cities becoming some kind of polis again. What he is proposing is an understanding of a multiplicity of demoi, and to rethink a form of citizenship that would be on a much more local or regional level. He says, and I think he’s right, that there would be much more of a possibility for people to exercise their rights of citizenship if it was understood in terms of such smaller forms of demoi.

I also find it very interesting that he opposes—because he sees the danger very clearly in the kind of federalism currently proposed by the Lega Nord or the Flemish Vlaamse Block and others—that federalism which is primarily of the rich against the poor, of the rich who don’t want to go on with the burden of subsidizing the poor. Cacciari’s type of federalism puts this into question, because it is not a federalism of separation, but one of interdependence that recognizes that all those regions can only find their identity in relation to others. A federalism not of separation from but a federalism of establishing links among many other smaller demoi: this, in my view, is clearly the direction in which we should be thinking if we want to redefine the idea of citizenship, and not in terms of any global form of citizenship.

BWJ: That clearly falls into your thinking about “agonism” versus “antagonism.” Among these local regions, or demoi, there is an us/them distinction, but
not necessarily a friend/enemy distinction. But here, as in your other work, you seem to want to propose something that I don’t know that I actually find in Schmitt, an agonism that is not the Schmittian antagonism between friend and enemy.

CM: Yes, what I actually say is that it is precisely not found in Schmitt. It is because he is not able to think in terms of agonism that he is prevented from thinking of the possibility of a pluralist democracy.

BWJ: So Cacciari complements that aspect of your own thinking.

CM: Yes, absolutely, and at a certain point, when he refers to the situation in Yugoslavia, he sees clearly that if we don’t move in that direction we are going to see more and more antagonistic conflict of the “us” and the “them” in terms of friend and enemy. This is going to be one of the consequences of globalization. While he doesn’t use the term “agonism,” Cacciari’s idea of federalism would, in my view, create the possibility of precisely such an agonistic type of relationship between different localities. What is interesting in this case is that he foresees the possibility of a multiplicity of institutions: of the ethnic kind, perhaps, but also around cities, or around cultural values. There is no a priori given to any particular grouping other than that they are communities that feel that they’ve got enough of a common destiny to want to have some form of self-government.

BWJ: Is it a necessity of defining a demos that it be territorially based?

CM: No, it’s not a necessity. Another thing that I’m interested in at the moment, although I’m not quite sure whether or not it would be compatible with Cacciari’s model and I’d need to examine it in more detail, is the proposal made by Otto Bauer and Carl Renner at the beginning of this century to reorganize the Austro-Hungarian Empire in such a way as to allow for more autonomy for the different groups within it. They were trying to think of democracy in ways that would give rights to groups that were not territorially based. What’s interesting in their proposal is that they were trying to see how to recognize the specificity of the different cultural groups found in the Austro-Hungarian Empire that weren’t territorially contiguous.

TK: The Yugoslavia problem, exactly.

CM: Yes.

BWJ: Can I ask a question again about the relationship to territory, to actual territory? Could one view the relationship to space as being a sort of sediment of a historical relationship and thereby disarticulate somewhat the relationship to physical location?

CM: To a certain extent, I would say, yes. But only to a certain extent. Because,
for instance, in the context of a larger demos like the European Community, one might want to create a forum for an exercise of rights that are not linked to place. But what we’re really discussing here is a question of the democratic rights of self-government. And it is always in the context of a demos that one is going to vote and decide how one wants to organize the political community: what kind of political choices we are going to make in terms of education, of employment, etc. This is what is at stake in democratic self-government. So, at least, we need to be considered a member of the community.

BWJ: Couldn’t one then reverse that and think of a model by which one could join a community that one wasn’t physically proximate to?

CM: Yes, I don’t see why not if we are talking in principle. But I believe people want to participate in the government of the place where they live and to affect that. I know the direction of much radical thinking now is against territoriality, but I find it hard to see that as a real progress. I think that the basic central issues will still be decided in terms of the territory.

BWJ: I’m also interested in the role played by capitalism in the radical democratic project and its theorization. Sometimes it seems to be a necessary precondition: the very possibility of a radical democracy described as arising on the basis of the dislocations produced by advanced or—as you call it at one point in _Hegemony and Socialist Strategy_—“disorganized” capitalism. But sometimes, as in your more recent efforts to disarticulate capitalism from the philosophy of liberalism, it seems contingent: merely one of the possible sites of oppression and antagonism. Could you elaborate a bit on the role played by capitalism?

CM: In _Hegemony_, one of our main aims was to criticize the traditional Marxist view that the development of capitalism was responsible for everything. We were arguing that it is rather on account of the pregnancy of the democratic imaginary and the discourse of democracy that a set of antagonisms can emerge. The basis for those antagonisms is given by the forms of oppression, which are linked to the development of capitalism—for instance, to the increasing commodification of social life—but they can only emerge as antagonisms because of the democratic discourse which allows such forms of subordination to be conceived as forms of oppression. It must be remembered that when we were writing _Hegemony_, it was still a moment when the traditional Marxist discourse was...
very important. We can’t really imagine it anymore, but it was a moment when the centrality of the working class was largely not put into question, when many people were dismissing the “new social movements” as being petit bourgeois, and the like. The very project of a radical democracy was to try to take account of such new forms of antagonisms, to reconsider a left-wing project that could no longer be formulated exclusively in terms of class contradictions. This was not to say that all those new forms of antagonism had nothing to do with capitalism. Instead, we were insisting that we could not explain the fact that they emerged as antagonisms simply as a product of economic developments. We needed to take much more seriously the importance of the democratic discourse in allowing such forms of subordination to be challenged. As we stated in our introduction, our position was post-Marxist, but it was also post-Marxist. Marxism was not something that we wanted to abandon completely. Today, the process of commodification has certainly reached a new level, but I don’t see why we should reconsider that aspect of the project of a radical and plural democracy.

In *Hegemony*, we were also criticizing the traditional Marxist idea that one needed to break completely with the liberal democratic regime. We insisted on the need to abandon the traditional idea of the revolution in the sense of a complete break. Instead, we were proposing what could be seen as an immanent critique of liberal democracy, understood as a political regime and not necessarily as a component of capitalism. That was something that I developed later in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, where I insisted that the problem of a radical democracy had to be understood in terms of a radical, liberal democracy. Yet already, from the moment of *Hegemony*, we considered that inside the liberal democratic tradition, understood as a regime whose ethico-political principles were liberty and equality for all, were all the symbolic resources that we needed to fight for a left-wing project that had otherwise been completely defined by socialism. I think that this has clearly been proven right, or, at least, now it would be generally accepted. What has become discredited is precisely the kind of left-wing project that we were fighting against at the time, a Soviet or a communist kind of solution.

There are some new rhetorics of anti-capitalism, found today, for instance, in the recent work of Slavoj Žižek. I find them, however, a little hollow, and I’m not quite sure what he really intends. If we had to rewrite *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* now, the one point that I would probably transform is the way we presented the radical democratic project in its relation with capitalism. The radical
democratic project definitely has an anti-capitalist dimension, but I’m not quite sure what it would mean today to fight against capitalism as a unified system that could be replaced by a completely different one.

BWJ: Does that mean that capitalism, as such, is unstoppable? That it has become, in effect, a force of nature?

CM: I don’t think that capitalism is unstoppable, but at the moment what we cannot clearly envisage is what a radical alternative to capitalism would be. What we can envisage, however, and what I think we should, is how we can pursue or produce a series of fights against certain forms of capitalism, or have some sort of regulation of capitalism. In my view, the most interesting development within anti-capitalist movements comes from those forms of resistance against the processes of globalization. They’re why I would not be too pessimistic in the manner of the Frankfurt School with respect to the possibilities for change. It’s true, of course, that there’s been an incredible commodification of society. In a sense, capitalism has almost managed to transform us entirely into consumers. But, at the same time, we’re already seeing the development of struggles against that. The fact that we’ve become transformed into consumers doesn’t mean that we’re merely going to accept all capitalist relations. To become a consumer does not mean that you become a passive subject; there are many forms in which, as consumers, you can fight against capitalism. Your identity becomes the locus of an antagonism, and I see a lot of potential for really important anti-capitalist resistances from within the very identity of the consumer.

BWJ: On the one hand, capitalism can be seen as you seem to be describing it, as the great—to use a Deleuzian term—determinitorializing force, a force that would cause the dislocations which can then become sites of antagonism. Perhaps more dangerous or harder to fight, however, is that force of inevitable re-territorialization or neutralization that happens as a result, once again, of capitalism. As a force, there’s this great stabilization that capitalism can mobilize to transform any critique into a form of commodity that thereby neutralizes that critique. In that sense, I’m not so sure that it is possible for an antagonism based upon commodification to get beyond simply recommodifying that antagonism as something else. It’s a capacity to neutralize by packaging.

CM: To neutralize . . . but, I would say, not definitively neutralize. To temporarily neutralize, perhaps, but these neutralizations can then give rise to another struggle. When I say “anti-capitalist struggles,” I always put it in the plural, because I don’t believe, precisely, in the anti-capitalist struggle. It’s always anti-capitalist
struggles, or a struggle with an anti-capitalist dimension. In order not to essentialize this thing, capitalism, we need to reformulate it. It’s much more complex.

Obviously there’s always the possibility that any kind of demand is going to be neutralized or recuperated, but that’s a constant of the hegemonic struggle. Capitalist institutions try to maintain their hegemony by neutralizing, by attempting to neutralize, those demands, but we can’t take it for granted that this will always be effective, or that such a neutralization will not in many cases influence relations of forces. Through the act of neutralization, capitalist institutions are transformed. It is not the same beast that eats us; it is transformed, and, although it might become worse, it might also become better. It’s really a war of position in Gramsci’s understanding. I think that’s exactly how we must understand it: a war of position in which we advance and in which there will always be possibilities of resistance. In fact, I don’t know what you think about the recent demonstrations in Seattle and Washington, D.C., but I think that these events are important although, of course, very ambivalent; there are many types of people there—but these are developments that show that, contrary to what we could have believed five years ago even, when capitalist hegemony was nearly unquestioned, there are possibilities of resistance.

BWJ: Actually, what I thought was that all those associated groups resembled a chain of equivalences in precisely the sense that you had set it up in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy . . .

CM: It’s important to be able to create such a chain of equivalence. In order to have a radical movement, you need to define an adversary or an enemy. And that is what was defined in Seattle and in Washington and, in a different sense, in the movement headed by José Bové in France. So a new form of politics is beginning to emerge because there is an enemy which is defined. I find it really interesting, and I see a big difference between that kind of project and people saying, let’s try to establish a cosmopolitan citizenship, or let’s try to establish a cosmopolitan
form of government. Such attempts do not have a definition of an enemy. They’re an extension of the liberal model of governments, which of course might be needed, but I don’t see anything very radical about that.

**TK:** But one way of interpreting the protests in Seattle and Washington is precisely in the direction of such cosmopolitan forms of government: as the demand that representatives of transnational civil society have a voice or become the locus or reference point of accountability for the transnational financial institutions. There’s a way in which the protesters in Seattle and Washington were saying: “there are powers exercised at a transnational level through these institutions, beyond the ordinary national institutions of democratic accountability. And they need to be made accountable, not to this or that government, but to something else: to the people, but not to the people of this or that state.” You’re right, though, it’s articulated antagonistically, which is what gives it its political force.

**CM:** I’ve seen some people giving precisely the interpretation you mention, but for me that’s not the most important potential of those movements which have the political potential of defining the friend and the enemy. Clearly in the case of José Bové, they’re defining themselves in opposition to the agribusiness in France. There is a strong antagonism at work, and I see a real radical potential in this.

**BWJ:** Did you say before that you would actually rewrite *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* to pull it further out of the Marxist legacy, because it’s perhaps no longer as alive as it was in 1985?

**CM:** I didn’t mean to say that I would take it further out of the Marxist tradition. I meant I would use a different vocabulary with respect to anti-capitalism. I’m not saying we were too Marxist there, I’m saying that at that point we still used an essentialist vocabulary with respect to capitalism.

We never put into question the importance of the economic analysis of Marxism. That is something that is still very relevant, and I do have sympathies for the people that are saying that the Left has thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Since the collapse of Soviet Communism, we’ve been left with a situation in which you cannot speak of the economy anymore without a charge of being an unreconstructed Marxist. We’ve been getting too far from Marx. We need to reintroduce those dimensions of the economy since we can’t, obviously, understand the phe-
nomenon of globalization independently from it. When I see, for instance, the kinds of things which are written by the theorists of the Third Way . . . it’s truly unbelievable. Those people have absolutely no understanding of what’s happening in the economy. In fact, there’s actually no economic analysis in most books on the Third Way, and that, of course, is very much linked to the near-complete hegemony of neo-liberalism today among socialist parties. Clearly this is something that I think we need to put into question. One needs to show that neoliberalism was the result of a political strategy. It is not something that is a simple development of technology or an inevitable fate. Moreover, the kind of globalization we are witnessing today is not the only alternative. I don’t think we can resist globalization in the sense in which the nationalists in many countries want; that’s impossible. But we can certainly define another strategy within globalization; there are alternatives within globalization.

In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, we were mainly criticizing the kind of political strategy that was found in Marxism. I certainly do not question the actual relevance of Marxist analysis, but, nevertheless, there are many, many things that a Marxist analysis does not allow us to understand. And that’s why, in many ways, I turned to Carl Schmitt. What I find interesting in Schmitt is the development of an insight that was present in Marx, but limited. The idea of antagonism is present in Marx, but it’s limited to the terms of class antagonism. When Schmitt insists that “the political” can emerge out of any kind of relation, be it religious, moral, artistic, or whatever, what he shows us is that class antagonism is just one manifestation of something that is much deeper. He makes us understand that antagonism is not something that we will ever be able to eradicate. We should read Schmitt, however, not in order to reject Marx, but to show that Marx’s insight concerning antagonism in the dimension of class should in fact be extended. The problem with Marxism has been to reduce all other antagonisms to class antagonism so that every kind of antagonism becomes some kind of epiphenomenon of the deeper, class antagonism.

BWJ: Someone like Fredric Jameson might argue—although I wouldn’t want to speak for him—that those forms of resistance to multinational and transnational corporations, such as were seen in Seattle, mean that we’re all realizing that we’re proletarians and must fight against multinational corporations.

CM: I think that that’s wrong. We need to understand that there is a dynamic of antagonism which is proper to many different spheres. You can’t just take it back and say this is all a consequence of capitalism. That’s my difference with such
a Marxist analysis. But, of course, the development of capitalist relations is a very important area to study. I think, from that point of view, we cannot ignore Marx.

BWJ: While you and Ernesto Laclau worked through the legacy of Marxism at great length in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, your more recent work has focused increasingly on liberalism. Does that in some way reflect on a currently moribund state of Marxist analysis?

CM: It’s true that I have recently been dealing much more with liberalism, but that is because I thought that it was also important to criticize liberalism. The traditional move among leftists who were critical of Marxism had been to show that there was really no proper understanding of “the political” in Marx. I think this is correct, but I also wanted, after having shown that, to show that the same was true of liberalism. It was a double move. On the one hand, to re-value liberalism in order to show that the specificity of modern democracy could not be understood outside of its articulation with liberalism. One of the main points in The Return of the Political is that pluralism is not something that comes from the democratic tradition. In fact, the democratic tradition left to itself is pregnant with totalitarianism. What allows us to interrupt such a development is the liberal discourse of pluralism. It was a re-value in the sense of arguing that we on the Left need to take liberalism more seriously, because it’s important to add to democracy this dimension of pluralism that we cannot do without. On the other hand, however, and this is the second move, we also need to be aware of the shortcomings of liberalism. Too many people on the Left fell into the celebration of liberal democracy. That’s why Schmitt became so important for me; he helped me to critique liberalism and to understand why the question of “the political” could not be thought within liberalism. So it was not simply a celebration of liberalism, it was really an engagement with some aspects of liberalism, while, at the same time, a critique of its shortcomings.

TK: This might be an opportune moment for you to suggest, at least briefly, perhaps, the role that the notion of public sphere plays in the project of radical democracy? And particularly how it plays that role against the background of other notions of the public sphere?

CM: One concern of my more recent work is, indeed, an attempt to envisage the nature of the public sphere in a democracy. I’ve basically been arguing against
the two main models of what is called “deliberative democracy”: against John Rawls on one side and Jürgen Habermas on the other. Both, in different ways, try to create a public sphere in which a rational consensus can be attained: Rawls by relegating everything divisive to the private; Habermas, in another way, because he does not exclude such divisive issues from the beginning, but allows them to come into the discussion and then screens them out by means of the rules of rational discourse. So, despite the fact that they claim to be theorizing pluralist democracy, pluralism is actually excluded from their conceptions of the public sphere. So, I’ve been trying to think about how one can truly imagine a pluralist public sphere, a public sphere which allows for contesting concepts and points of view, for real confrontation. I’ve been trying to develop a democratic model which I call “agonistic pluralism,” which is an alternative not only to deliberative democracy, but also to an aggregative model of democracy. Both of them, in different ways again, are completely rationalistic, because the aggregative model believes that, in the sphere of politics, people are mainly moved by their interests. This is what makes them act, and democracy is involved in the negotiation of those interests and the finding of a way to aggregate those differences. That is the model of democracy that has really been dominant since the end of the Second World War.

Here, I think again in terms of Carl Schmitt: one of the reasons that liberals cannot really understand politics, he says, is that for them the individual is the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem. So if you start and finish with the individual, you can never really grasp the specificity of “the political,” which is always a collective identification. What makes people act politically is what I’ve called “passions.” Collective identifications have to do with desire, with fantasies, with everything that is precisely not interests or the rational. Instead of thinking about politics as a place where we should all get together and try to find the rational solution—this is not what politics is about at all—politics needs to speak to people about their passions in order to mobilize them toward democratic designs. I’m trying to think of a model of the public sphere which will not be one where people leave aside all their differences in order to try to reach a consensus, but precisely a sphere where an agonistic confrontation takes place. For, to see that you can really exercise your rights, you need to be given alternatives. If you don’t have the choice, then the whole democratic process is completely meaningless.

This understanding of the public sphere links up again to what we discussed in terms of antagonism and agonism. Against Schmitt’s idea of antagonism as a
struggle between friend and enemy, what I call agonism is an us/them distinction thought of in terms of adversaries. There is a real confrontation between adversaries, but there is nevertheless also a symbolic space which is common, while in an antagonistic relation there is no symbolic space in common. In an adversarial relation, you’ve got something in common, which, in our case, is the allegiance to the ethico-political principle of liberal democracy—liberty and equality for all—even though we are going to have different interpretations of those principles, between a radical democratic interpretation, for instance, or a social democratic interpretation, or whatever. If there is a vibrant, political public sphere where this kind of confrontation can take place, it is less likely that there will be confrontations about non-negotiable issues or essentialist identities. What I’m arguing is that this form of agonistic public sphere is not something that should be seen as negative or threatening for democracy. On the contrary, it is what can keep democracy alive and impede the danger of extreme right-wing movements that could mobilize passions in an anti-democratic way.

**TK:** What rules govern exclusion from the public sphere? You said, first, that it’s about a failure to adhere to the motto of liberty and equality for all. Could you make a more immanent rule? Would this be another way of phrasing it: that there’s a commitment to the existence of a public sphere? There you’d be very close to Lefort and his definition of the public sphere as the space of the legitimacy of the debate about what is legitimate and what is illegitimate.

**CM:** Yes. Exactly. I would also stress the fact that such a debate should not be understood in a rationalistic way but in terms of the mobilization of passions and collective forms of identification. This is why artistic practices have such an important role to play in the public sphere.
Notes

1. This interview took place in New York on 27 April 2000. Because of prior time commitments, Rosalyn Deutsche was obliged to leave before the interview’s conclusion.

2. Carl Schmitt was a political theorist and critic of liberal democracy whose writings include The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1926), trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985) and The Concept of the Political (1927), trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Although he is a controversial figure on account of his having joined the Nazi Party in 1933, his ideas have increasingly been studied by political theorists of the Left, foremost among them Chantal Mouffe. It is her position that one must think “with Schmitt against Schmitt” and that his trenchant critique of liberal democracy can elucidate its shortcomings, not in order to reject liberal democracy, but in order to envisage how those shortcomings can be remedied or overcome. For further discussion, see Chantal Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999) and Mouffe, “Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy” in The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 36–59.


5. See Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox.


